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1Demand Price Sensitivity and Market Power in a
Congested Fuel and Electricity Network
Sarah M. Ryan, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Fixed demands for electricity are incorporated into a
game theoretic model of strategic generators who are supplied by
a fuel transportation network and produce power for a congested
electricity transportation network governed by an independent
system operator. Some counter-intuitive effects on measures of
market power result from reducing the proportion of demands
that are fixed rather than price-sensitive. Examination of the dual
prices found in the complementarity problem’s solution reveal
how these effects result from either a load pocket created by
transmission congestion or the cost structure induced by the fuel
supply network. One of the counter-intuitive effects also appears
in a competitive benchmark model.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN restructured electricity markets, generating companiessubmit bids to supply electricity at prices based on their
marginal costs, which are driven largely by fuel costs. In
each regional wholesale power market, an independent system
operator (ISO) manages electricity transmission and sets loca-
tional marginal prices (LMPs) to match supplies with demands
at each location on the constrained grid. To understand the
interaction between constraints on fuel supply and constraints
on electricity transmission, we recently developed and tested
a game theoretic model that combines both sets of constraints
[1], [2]. It includes (1) costs of extracting and transporting
finite supplies of fuels across routes with limited capacity, (2)
strategic decisions of generators at different locations across a
congested electricity transmission network, (3) price-sensitive
demands for electricity, and (4) matching of electricity supply
and demand across the network to maximize total social
welfare subject to physical transmission constraints. Given
the fuel and electricity network topology and capacities, fuel
supplies and costs, transmission line reactances, and demand
functions, the model produces LMPs and quantities of elec-
tricity generated and consumed at each location on the grid.
These represent a static view of, say, a particular hour in some
scenario of cost, capacity and demand.
Market equilibrium models typically rely on demand func-
tions with finite negative slopes but, in the absence of clear
price signals or the ability to respond to them, most demand
for electricity is not actually sensitive to price. For example,
according to [3], in MISO “only about 1% of the total bid-in
demand for the day-ahead market is price sensitive.” If the
demand lacks price sensitivity, there is potential for strategic
generators to exert market power by withholding production
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to raise prices. In this paper, we modify the model of [1] to
include fixed as well as price-sensitive demands and test the
effects on measures of market power of changing the levels of
fixed demand. For each level of fixed demand and each hour in
a time horizon, an equilibrium is computed by solving a linear
mixed complementarity problem. For comparison, equilibria
are also computed in a competitive benchmark model in which
the ISO dispatches price-taking generators supplied by the
same fuel network.
In a numerical example from [2], we examine the behavior
of two measures of market power, the Lerner Index and the
Relative Market Advantage Index [4], for each generator as
amounts of fixed demands are systematically decreased but
an invariant linear price-quantity relationship governs demand
beyond the fixed quantities. Both measures of market power
would be expected to decrease along with the fixed demands
as a larger proportion of the demand effectively becomes
sensitive to price. Contrary to this intuition, in the strategic-
generator model, we observe that these market power measures
can increase for some generators as the fixed demands are
reduced from their maximum levels. By decomposing the
electricity prices and generator marginal costs into the dual
prices of different constraints, we find that the Lerner Index for
a low-cost generator may increase under congestion because
the dual price of either its capacity constraint or its residual
demand increases. It may also increase as fixed demands
diminish in the absence of congestion due to the cost structure
derived from the fuel network. Increasing Lerner Indices due
to increasing dual prices of generating capacity also appear
in the competitive benchmark case. Moreover, the Relative
Market Advantage Index may increase as the drop in fixed
demands from their maximum levels reduces the severity of a
load pocket.
II. MODEL AND NOTATION
As in [1] and [2], we model the electricity system along with
its fuel supply as a network of electricity nodes and fuel supply
nodes with fuel transportation routes as directed arcs from the
fuel nodes to the electricity nodes and electricity transmission
lines as directed arcs connecting the electricity nodes. Table I
specifies the sets of nodes and arcs. Assume each electricity
node in N has exactly one load-serving entity (LSE) and one
generator. We allow for nodes without generators by setting
their generation capacities to zero, while multiple generators
at the same node can be modeled by connecting dummy nodes
with infinite-capacity transmission lines.
The data for the model include parameters of linear demand
functions as well as fixed demand quantities for the LSEs;
© 2010 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, 
including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to 
servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
2TABLE II
MODEL PARAMETERS
Parameter Description Dimension
a Intercepts of electricity demand prices as linear functions of quantities nE × 1
b Slopes of electricity demand prices as linear functions of quantities nE × 1
L Fixed demands nE × 1
V Generation capacities nE × 1
D Power transfer distribution factors based on a fixed reference node r ∈ N mE × nE
K Transmission line capacities mE × 1
Z Quantities of fuel available nF × 1
c Costs per MWh-equivalent of fuel transported mF × 1
U Capacities of fuel supply lines mF × 1
TABLE I
SETS OF NODES AND ARCS
Set Description Indices Cardinality
N Electricity nodes i, j nE
B Electricity transmission lines l mE
F Fuel supply nodes g nF
A Fuel supply lines gj mF
capacities of generators, transmission lines, and fuel supply
routes; and quantities of fuels available together with their
costs. The model parameters are described in Table II. Assume
each demand function slope bi < 0, i ∈ N . Any node i
without a load has Li = ai = 0, bi = −∞. Flows on the
transmission lines are modeled in terms of a lossless direct
current approximation of Kirchhoff’s laws using power trans-
fer distribution factors (PTDFs). The elementD l,j specifies the
change in flow on line l that results from a one-unit injection
of electricity at node j accompanied by a corresponding one-
unit withdrawal at the fixed reference node. For simplicity, we
assume that generation costs are due solely to fuel. Multiple
fuel types may be included in the fuel supply network, where
all flows are in MWh of energy content. The cost per unit
of flow on a fuel arc (f, j) includes all costs for procuring
the fuel at the origin f , transporting it, and converting it to
electricity at the destination j. A given generator may obtain
fuels from multiple supply nodes at different costs and each
fuel node may supply multiple generators. The fuel network
in this paper ignores the different time horizons that arise
from fuel storage capabilities and assumes costs and capacities
are on an hourly basis. A non-bipartite network incorporating
storage and multiple time scales [5] could be substituted.
The model centers on decisions of the generators. We
assume that each is an independent Cournot competitor that
decides its own generation quantity, given the corresponding
quantities of other generators. In the Nash-Cournot equilibrium
model, generators make these decisions simultaneously. We
combine these decisions with downstream decisions of an
independent system operator (ISO) that determines quantities
of electricity supplied and consumed at each node, given the
generation quantities, by specifying nodal injections. Rather
than assuming a known form for the generation cost, such as
linear or quadratic, we explicitly model costs that result from
a fuel supply network by including the fuel flows upstream
of the generators. We assume these flows are decided by
a non-strategic fuel dispatcher that minimizes the total cost
of delivering the fuel required by the generators given their
decisions. Primal and dual decision variables are summarized
in Table III. The dual variable η represents the price of
electricity at the reference node while p is the vector of
nodal electricity prices. Also define the nodal price premia,
φ ≡ p− ηe, where e is a vector of ones.
Let Fj ⊆ F be the set of fuel supply nodes g such that
there exists an arc from g to j and Ng be the set of electricity
nodes j supplied by fuel node g. The fuel dispatcher’s (primal)
decision problem is a linear transportation problem:
minx≥0
∑
gj∈A
cgjxgj
s.t.
∑
j∈Ng
xgj ≤ Zg, ∀g ∈ F [ωg ≥ 0]∑
g∈Fj
xgj ≥ yj , ∀j ∈ N [pij ≥ 0]
xgj ≤ Ugj , ∀gj ∈ A [ρgj ≥ 0]
Here, the first set of constraints are on the fuel supplies, the
second set ensure that the fuel delivery to each generator meets
the demand created by electricity production, and the third
enforce the fuel transportation capacities. We assume without
loss of generality that Zg > 0, ∀g ∈ F , and Ugj ≥ 0, ∀gj ∈
A. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions necessary for
optimality are:
0 ≤ xgj⊥cgj + ωg − pij + ρgj ≥ 0, ∀gj ∈ A (1)
0 ≤ pij⊥
∑
g∈Fj
xgj − yj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ N (2)
0 ≤ ωg⊥Zg −
∑
j∈Ng
xgj ≥ 0, ∀g ∈ F (3)
0 ≤ ρgj⊥Ugj − xgj ≥ 0, ∀gj ∈ A (4)
Also given the decisions of the generators, the ISO’s de-
cision problem is to maximize social welfare, which is the
total consumer willingness-to-pay less the sum of all the
generation costs. It is equivalent to the sum of consumers’
surplus, producers’ surplus, and transmission rents, where the
transmission rent from the flow on a line is the amount of flow
multiplied by the difference in the nodal prices at either end.
The consumer willingness-to-pay can be evaluated as the total
area under the demand functions up to the quantities supplied.
On the other hand, the total generation cost is constant with
respect to the ISO’s decisions and, therefore, can be omitted
3TABLE III
DECISION VARIABLES
Variable Description Player Dimension
x Quantities of fuel delivered Fuel Dispatcher mF × 1
ω Dual values for supplies at fuel nodes Fuel Dispatcher nF × 1
pi Dual values for demands by generators Fuel Dispatcher nE × 1
ρ Dual values for fuel line capacities Fuel Dispatcher mF × 1
q Demand satisfied at electricity nodes ISO nL × 1
r Net injections of electricity at electricity nodes ISO nE × 1
η Dual value for total generation equals satisfied demand ISO Scalar
p Dual values for electricity market clearing conditions ISO nE × 1
δ Dual values for fixed demands for electricity ISO nE × 1
λ+ Dual values for upper bounds on transmission from lower- to higher-numbered node ISO mE × 1
λ− Dual values for upper bounds on transmission from higher- to lower-numbered node ISO mE × 1
y Generation amounts Generators nE × 1
β Dual values for aggregated electricity demand Generators nE × 1
µ Dual values for generation capacities Generators nE × 1
from the primal formulation as a quadratic program:
maxq,r
∑
j∈N
(
ajqj + 12bjq
2
j
)
s.t. ∑j∈N rj = 0 [η]
qj − rj = yj ∀j ∈ N [pj ]
qj ≥ Lj ∀j ∈ N [ δj ≥ 0]∑
j∈N Dljrj ≤ Kl ∀l ∈ B [λ+l ≥ 0]
−∑j∈N Dljrj ≤ Kl ∀l ∈ B [λ−l ≥ 0]
The five sets of constraints represent, respectively, require-
ments that there is no net injection by the ISO, conservation
of energy at each node, satisfaction of fixed demands, and
thermal capacity constraints on the transmission flows in either
direction. Note that, given the fixed demand constraints, the
objective is equivalent to maximizing ∫ qjLj (aj + bjs) ds, whichrepresents the total consumer willingness-to-pay for price-
sensitive quantities beyond the fixed demands. The ISO KKT
conditions are:
aj + bjqj − pj + δj = 0 ∀j ∈ N (5)
−η + pj − φj = 0 ∀j ∈ N (6)∑
j∈N
rj = 0 (7)
qj − rj = yj ∀j ∈ N (8)
0 ≤ δj⊥− Lj + qj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N (9)
0 ≤ λ+l ⊥Kl −
∑
j∈N
Dljrj ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ B (10)
0 ≤ λ−l ⊥Kl +
∑
j∈N
Dljrj ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ B, (11)
where φj =
∑
l Dlj(λ
+
l − λ−l ), ∀j ∈ N .
Next we consider generator i’s problem of maximizing
profit, which is the difference of revenue and generation cost,
subject to its capacity constraint. Revenue depends on the ISO
decisions while cost is determined by the fuel dispatch. We
will set the fuel charges such that each generator pays for just
the fuel that it uses (there is no congestion charge); this means
that generator i is charged an amount ∑
g|gi∈A
cgixgi, determined
from the optimal solution to the fuel dispatch problem. Ryan
et al. [1] proved that in the case of unlimited fuel supply
(Z = ∞) it is sufficient for generator i to see only pii, the
marginal cost of fuel associated with its current generation
level.
Generator i sells its production at the price pi determined
by the ISO. For tractability, we adopt the bounded rationality
assumption of [6], in which each generator observes the price
premia at each node relative to the reference node, and does
not anticipate the effect of its decisions on the transmission
quantities. Specifically, the ISO’s dual decision variables, φ,
are constants in each generator’s decision problem (as are the
fuel dispatcher’s dual decision variables, pi). In [1] and [2],
generator i’s decision problem is to maximize its profit, given
by (η + φi − pii)yi, subject to its capacity constraint yi ≤
Vi as well as a constraint equating total market supply with
total market demand. All of the generator problems are solved
simultaneously with the ISO and the fuel dispatch problems.
Upon inclusion of the fixed demand constraints in the ISO
problem, its KKT conditions (5) - (8) together imply that∑
j
yj =
∑
j
η + φj − δj − aj
bj
.
For consistency, therefore, we assume that generator i accounts
for the price increases δ induced by the fixed demands as
well as the nodal price premia φ induced by the transmission
constraints. It strategically chooses a generation amount y i to
set the reference node price according to the residual market
demand given the other generation amounts. Generator i’s
decision problem is:
maxyi≥0,η (η + φi − pii)yi
s.t. yi −
(∑nE
j=1
1
bj
)
η =∑nE
j=1
φj−δj−aj
bj
−∑j $=i yj [βi]
yi ≤ Vi [µi ≥ 0]
The whole set of generator KKT conditions is given by:
0 ≤ yj⊥− η − φj + pij + βj + µj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ N (12)
0 ≤ µj⊥Vj − yj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ N (13)
yj +
(∑
i∈N
1
bi
)
βj = 0, ∀j ∈ N (14)
The generator residual demand constraints are omitted due to
redundancy with the ISO conditions.
4If an equilibrium exists, it may be identified by solving the
linear mixed complementarity problem given by (1) - (14). The
existence of an equilibrium for this game was established in [1]
for the case where L = 0. The proof has not yet been extended
to L > 0 but we conjecture that existence will hold under
suitable conditions on the fuel transportation, generation, and
electricity transmission capacities.
III. COMPETITIVE BENCHMARK
Assume henceforth that Z = ∞, in which case the fuel
dispatch problem can be decomposed into separate problems
for each generator. For this case, Ryan et al. [1] showed that
an equilibrium for the problem given in Section II is also
an equilibrium in a modified problem where each generator
optimizes its own fuel supply from the network. A compet-
itive benchmark can be constructed by omitting the separate
generator optimization problems and instead including their
decisions (including fuel procurement) in the ISO optimization
problem. In this case, the ISO dispatches the generators to
maximize consumer willingness-to-pay less the true generation
costs derived from the fuel network. The KKT conditions are
identical to (1) - (13) with βj ≡ 0, ∀j.
In constrast, the economic interpretation of βj in a strategic-
generator equilibrium (found by solving (1) - (14)) can be
seen by substituting conditions (12) into generator i’s residual
demand constraint and simplifying the latter to
yi =
∑
j
qj −
∑
j $=i
yj.
Because the demand function slopes bi are negative, equations
(14) imply that βj ≥ 0 for all j. This implies that the
residual demand constraint in each generator decision problem
is acting as a “less than or equal to” inequality (see [7], p.
165). Therefore, βj represents the marginal benefit that would
accrue to generator j if either total demand increased or total
production by the other generators decreased.
IV. RESULTS IN NUMERICAL TESTS
We tested the effects of adding fixed demands in the 6-
node system from [2], depicted in Figure 1. Tables IV and V,
respectively, contain the transmission line and demand data.
The slope of the demand function is bj = −0.08, j = 4, 5, 6,
in each hour. The fuel network and generation data shown in
Table VI are the same as in [2] except that the capacities of
the higher-cost arcs into each generation node are inflated to
render those constraints non-binding. We obtained results for
all 24 hours but focus our analysis in this paper on four of
them: Hour 4 has the lowest demand of the day and hour 17
represents the peak, while hours 11 and 0 represent medium-
high and medium-low demands, respectively.
A qualitative description of the network is as follows: Gen-
erators at nodes 1 - 3 are supplied with fuel at comparatively
low cost from “coal” nodes C1 and C2, but they potentially
are isolated from the demand nodes 4 - 6 by thin transmission
lines (1, 4), (3, 4) and (3, 6). Generator 1 has high capacity but
there is a significant jump in its fuel cost when the fuel supply
arc (C1, 1) is saturated. On the demand side of the network,
generation from “gas” supplied by G1 and G2 is much more
expensive. Generator 5 has high capacity, and can obtain a
limited amount of fuel on arc (G2, 5) at relatively low cost.
Generator 4 is a “peaker” generator with low capacity and
high cost. Demand is highest at node 6 (where no generation
is located), followed by node 5 and then node 4.
Different levels of fixed demand are adjusted using a factor
R to represent the degree of price-sensitivity of demand,
similarly to [8]. For a given value of R and a given hour,
h, the fixed demand is Lj(h) = (1 − R)L¯j(h). Thus, R = 1
represents the case when demand is fully price-sensitive, as
in [2], and R = 0 corresponds to the highest levels of fixed
demand. We computed an equilibrium in each hour for each
value of R from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.1.
TABLE IV
TRANSMISSION LINE DATA
Line, l Kl xl
(1,3) 400.0 0.0064
(1,4) 240.0 0.0297
(2,3) 1000.0 negl.
(3,4) 150.0 0.0304
(3,6) 250.0 0.0281
(4,5) 240.0 0.0297
(5,6) 350.0 0.0108
TABLE V
DEMAND DATA
Node 4 Node 5 Node 6
Hour(s), h a4(h) L¯4(h) a5(h) L¯5(h) a6(h) L¯6(h)
0 21.05 250.00 31.65 300.00 35.50 350.00
1 20.60 230.66 30.39 276.80 33.95 322.93
2 20.30 217.89 29.55 261.47 32.92 305.04
3,6 20.15 211.44 29.13 253.73 32.40 296.02
4 20.00 205.11 28.72 246.13 31.89 287.16
5 20.07 208.28 28.93 249.93 32.15 291.59
7 20.45 224.33 29.97 269.20 33.44 314.07
8 21.20 256.33 32.06 307.60 36.01 358.86
9,13 21.81 282.00 33.74 338.40 38.08 394.80
10,12 21.96 288.44 34.16 346.13 38.60 403.82
11,16 22.03 291.61 34.37 349.93 38.85 408.25
14,15,22 21.73 278.83 33.53 334.60 37.82 390.37
17 32.61 320.44 66.07 384.53 78.24 448.62
18 23.90 307.67 39.78 369.20 45.55 430.73
19 22.33 304.39 35.20 365.26 39.88 426.14
20 22.26 301.22 35.00 361.47 39.63 421.71
21 22.11 294.78 34.57 353.73 39.11 412.69
23 21.28 259.61 32.28 311.53 36.28 363.46
A. Strategic Generator Results
The results for each hour and each value of R include the
nodal prices, the quantities of electricity generated and con-
sumed at each node, electricity transmission flows, amounts
of fuel transported on each supply arc, and marginal cost of
fuel to each generator. In this model, the marginal fuel cost
is the same as the marginal generation cost. If the generation
quantity of generator j, yj > 0 in an equilibrium, its Lerner
Index (LI) is its marginal profit as a proportion of the nodal
price:
LIj =
pj − pij
pj
.
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Fig. 1. Six node transmission grid with fuel network
TABLE VI
FUEL AND GENERATION COST AND CAPACITY DATA
j = 1 2 3 4 5
f cfj Ufj Vj cfj Ufj Vj cfj Ufj Vj cfj Ufj Vj cfj Ufj Vj
C1 10.00 200.0 15.90 166.7 14.83 173.3
C2 16.30 500.0 15.00 33.3 14.00 36.7
G1 30.00 66.7 32.80 446.7
G2 33.60 233.3 25.00 173.3
Total 700.0 600.0 200.0 100.0 210.0 110.0 300.0 200.0 620.0 520.0
This index is one measure of market power in a monopoly.
Intuitively, we would expect it to decrease as R increases
because, when more of the demand is price-sensitive then
strategic generators would lose more profit if they attempted
to raise prices by withholding generation. However, this effect
could be muted or even reversed in an oligopolistic market
subject to network congestion. The equilibrium results show
that, for the higher-cost generators 4 and 5 co-located with
demands, the LI does decrease with R. However, for the
lower-cost generators separated from the load by a congested
transmission line, the LI may increase with R. Figures 2,
3, 4, and 5 show the LIs computed for each generator for
different R in the low, medium-low, medium-high, and peak
hour, respectively. In all hours, LI2 and LI3 increase with
small values of R. This is also true for generator 1 in all but the
lowest-demand hours 1. The LI for generator 1 also increases
with R approaching 1 in all hours. We focus on the results in
the moderately low-demand hour 0, where both of these effects
are most sustained. Table VII shows the generation quantities,
prices and amounts of demand satisfied at each node for each
R. Table VIII shows the corresponding electricity transmission
quantities. As R increases from 0 to 0.1; i.e., the fixed demands
decrease from L¯j to 0.9L¯j, expensive generation at nodes
4 and 5 is reduced and less-expensive generation at node 1
actually increases. The nodal price separation also decreases.
Some insight into the increase of LI with small values
of R for generators 1-3 is gained by examining the decom-
position of price and marginal cost into the dual prices of
constraints, as shown in Table IX for generators 1 and 3
(corresponding values for generator 2, qualitatively similar
to those for generator 3, are omitted to save space). From
1A similar effect was reported in a computational agent simulation of the
same example with quadratic generation costs [9] but vanished when the
generator reinforcement learning parameters were calibrated [8].
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Fig. 2. Lerner Indices for strategic generators vs. R in low-demand hour 4.
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Fig. 3. Lerner Indices for strategic generators vs. R in moderately low-
demand hour 0.
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STRATEGIC-GENERATOR EQUILIBRIUM PRICES AND QUANTITIES IN HOUR 0. DEMAND SATISFIED SHOWN IN ITALICS IF IT INCLUDES SOME
PRICE-SENSITIVE DEMAND.
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6
R y1 p1 y2 p2 y3 p3 y4 p4 q4 y5 p5 q5 p6 q6
0.0 339.47 25.35 100.00 24.25 110.00 24.25 17.74 30.47 250.00 332.79 41.67 300.00 45.75 350.00
0.1 343.22 25.45 100.00 24.49 110.00 24.49 0.00 29.91 225.00 256.78 39.65 270.00 43.19 315.00
0.2 334.80 25.23 100.00 24.40 110.00 24.40 0.00 29.07 200.00 175.20 37.47 240.00 40.53 280.00
0.3 326.38 25.00 100.00 24.83 110.00 24.83 0.00 25.79 175.00 93.62 27.50 210.00 28.12 245.00
0.4 317.95 24.78 100.00 24.74 110.00 24.74 0.00 24.95 150.00 12.05 25.32 180.00 25.46 210.00
0.5 240.00 22.70 100.00 22.70 110.00 22.70 0.00 22.70 125.00 0.00 22.70 150.00 22.70 175.00
0.6 200.00 21.18 100.00 21.18 110.00 21.18 0.00 21.18 100.00 0.00 21.18 130.94 21.18 179.06
0.7 200.00 20.18 100.00 20.18 110.00 20.18 0.00 20.18 75.00 0.00 20.18 143.44 20.18 191.56
0.8 200.00 19.18 100.00 19.18 110.00 19.18 0.00 19.18 50.00 0.00 19.18 155.94 19.18 204.06
0.9 200.00 18.52 98.12 18.52 110.00 18.52 0.00 18.52 31.67 0.00 18.52 164.17 18.52 212.29
1.0 200.00 18.52 98.12 18.52 110.00 18.52 0.00 18.52 31.67 0.00 18.52 164.17 18.52 212.29
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Fig. 4. Lerner Indices for strategic generators vs. R in moderately high-
demand hour 11.
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Fig. 5. Lerner Indices for strategic generators vs. R in peak-demand hour
17.
equations (6) and (12), yj > 0 implies that pj = pij +βj +µj .
Therefore, LIj = βj+µjpij+βj+µj , where from equation (14),
βj = −
(∑
i∈N
1
bi
)−1
yj . If generator j produces more
electricity at the same marginal cost while remaining below its
generating capacity, then its LI increases due to the increase
in βj with both pij and µj remaining constant. This is the
case for generator 1 in hour 0 as R increases from 0.0 to 0.1.
The increasing values of β1 indicate that relaxing the fixed
demand constraints causes the high-cost generators 4 and 5
TABLE VIII
STRATEGIC-GENERATOR EQUILIBRIUM TRANSMISSION FLOWS IN HOUR 0,
BOLD IF AT CAPACITY.
R 1,3 1,4 2,3 3,4 3,6 4,5 5,6
0.0 169.9 169.6 100.0 129.9 250.0 67.2 100.0
0.1 171.6 171.7 100.0 131.6 250.0 78.2 65.0
0.2 167.8 167.0 100.0 127.8 250.0 94.8 30.0
0.3 164.1 162.3 100.0 124.1 250.0 111.4 -5.0
0.4 160.3 157.7 100.0 120.3 250.0 128.0 -40.0
0.5 109.3 130.7 100.0 104.7 214.6 110.4 -39.6
0.6 86.4 113.6 100.0 92.8 203.5 106.5 -24.5
0.7 91.1 108.9 100.0 87.2 213.9 121.2 -22.3
0.8 95.8 104.2 100.0 81.6 224.2 135.8 -20.1
0.9 99.6 100.4 98.1 77.1 230.6 145.9 -18.3
1.0 99.6 100.4 98.1 77.1 230.6 145.9 -18.3
located near demands to back off generation to an extent that
the residual demand seen by generator 1 actually increases.
Similarly, if generator j is producing at capacity but there is
pressure on it to increase, as is the case for generators 2 and 3
in hour 0 as R increases from 0.0 to 0.1 and from 0.2 to 0.3,
then LIj increases because µj increases and forms a larger
component of the price. This first type of effect occurs when
R is small enough that only fixed demand is met.
The increase of LI1 with large R occurs where the low-
cost fuel arc directed into generator 1 is fully saturated but
no high-cost fuel is used. From equation (1), if xgj > 0 then
the marginal cost pij = cgj + ρgj (recall that wg = 0 for all g
here because Zg is unlimited). As R increases from 0.6 to 0.9;
i.e., the fixed demands decrease, the dual price of additional
low-cost fuel decreases. This results in the numerator of
LI1 remaining constant (equal to β1, proportional to y1)
while the price at node 1 decreases. This second type of
effect occurs when R is large enough that the fixed demand
constraints are not binding. Note that it is a direct result
of the piecewise-linear cost structure derived from the fuel
transportation network. It results from congestion in the fuel
supply network rather than the electricity transmission system.
Economic measures, totaled over market participants and
averaged over all hours, are shown in Table X. Generator
cost and revenue along with consumer payments for energy
consumed all decrease with R. ISO surplus, equal to the
difference between consumer payments and generator revenue,
decreases with small values of R but increases again as R
approaches 1. The ISO surplus can also be computed by
7summing over transmission lines the product of the line flow
and the price differential. The increase in average hourly ISO
surplus is attributable to the peak hours 17 and 18, in which
line (3,6) is congested for each R and significant amounts of
price-sensitive demand are satisfied for large R.
TABLE IX
DUAL PRICES RELEVANT TO LIS FOR STRATEGIC GENERATORS 1 AND 3 IN
HOUR 0. COST c∗j AND DUAL VALUE ρ∗j ARE FOR THE MARGINAL FUEL
ARC DIRECTED INTO NODE j .
Node 1 Node 3
R c∗1 ρ∗1 β1 µ1 c∗3 ρ∗3 β3 µ3
0.0 16.30 0.00 9.05 0.00 14.83 0.00 2.93 6.49
0.1 16.30 0.00 9.15 0.00 14.83 0.00 2.93 6.73
0.2 16.30 0.00 8.93 0.00 14.83 0.00 2.93 6.64
0.3 16.30 0.00 8.70 0.00 14.83 0.00 2.93 7.08
0.4 16.30 0.00 8.48 0.00 14.83 0.00 2.93 6.98
0.5 16.30 0.00 6.40 0.00 14.83 0.00 2.93 4.94
0.6 10.00 5.84 5.33 0.00 14.83 0.00 2.93 3.42
0.7 10.00 4.84 5.33 0.00 14.83 0.00 2.93 2.42
0.8 10.00 3.84 5.33 0.00 14.83 0.00 2.93 1.42
0.9 10.00 3.18 5.33 0.00 14.83 0.00 2.93 0.76
1.0 10.00 3.18 5.33 0.00 14.83 0.00 2.93 0.76
TABLE X
STRATEGIC GENERATOR AVERAGE HOURLY TOTAL COST, GENERATOR
REVENUE, CONSUMER PAYMENTS AND ISO SURPLUS.
R Gen. Cost Gen. Revenue Cons. Pmts ISO Surplus
0.0 19400.14 8355.97 40595.06 9145.12
0.1 16290.83 8502.86 32988.44 6781.52
0.2 13383.57 8497.65 27476.82 5401.83
0.3 10732.93 8225.87 21221.64 3143.19
0.4 8581.35 7431.84 15648.63 1062.90
0.5 6775.81 6195.30 12125.20 447.76
0.6 6044.71 4955.57 10481.46 426.41
0.7 5804.95 4594.64 9951.62 443.06
0.8 5557.23 4260.47 9434.70 459.72
0.9 5425.07 4023.39 9039.52 469.89
1.0 5398.97 3947.31 8915.45 475.20
B. Competitive Benchmark Results
Table XI shows the nodal prices as well as quantities of
electricity produced and demand satisfied in hour 0 for the
competitive benchmark and Table XII shows the corresponding
transmission amounts. As expected, prices are lower for each
value of R. The satisfaction of higher amounts of price-
sensitive demand results in congestion and price separation
for all values of R. For the most part, more of the generation
is by lower-cost generators 1-3 than in the strategic-generator
model. The effect of the fuel supply network is seen in the
generation quantities, y2, of generator 2. It produces less in
the competitive benchmark case than in the strategic case for
R values less than 0.5 as all of the low-cost fuel available but
none of its high-cost fuel is used.
In the competitive results for hour 0, the Lerner Index for
generator 1 is 0 but those for generators 2 and 3 are positive
and increase with R (see Figure 6). With βj = 0, the Lerner
Index is simply LIj = µjpij+µj , where pij = cfj + ρfj for the
marginal fuel arc (f, j). Table XIII shows the components of
price and marginal cost in hour 0 for these two nodes. The
increases in a generator’s LI occur when its capacity constraint
TABLE XII
COMPETITIVE BENCHMARK EQUILIBRIUM TRANSMISSION FLOWS IN
HOUR 0, BOLD IF AT CAPACITY.
R 1,3 1,4 2,3 3,4 3,6 4,5 5,6
0.0 237.6 185.2 33.3 130.9 250.0 66.2 100.0
0.1 233.8 180.6 33.3 127.2 250.0 82.7 65.0
0.2 230.1 175.9 33.3 123.4 250.0 99.3 30.0
0.3 226.3 171.2 33.3 119.6 250.0 115.9 -5.0
0.4 222.6 166.6 33.3 115.9 250.0 132.5 -40.0
0.5 152.2 147.6 100.0 112.2 250.0 134.8 -36.1
0.6 144.1 137.6 100.0 104.1 250.0 141.7 -32.3
0.7 136.0 127.6 100.0 96.0 250.0 148.6 -28.5
0.8 129.7 119.8 100.0 89.7 250.0 154.0 -25.5
0.9 129.7 119.8 100.0 89.7 250.0 154.0 -25.5
1.0 129.7 119.8 100.0 89.7 250.0 154.0 -25.5
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Fig. 6. Lerner Indices for competitive generators vs. R in moderately low-
demand hour 0.
more tightly binds the solution to the ISO’s total welfare max-
imization problem. Here, µj represents the marginal increase
in the total welfare that would accrue if generation capacity
could be increased at node j.
The Relative Market Advantage Index, which measures the
increase in profits earned by a strategic generator compared to
the competitive benchmark, has been proposed as a necessary
indicator of market power [4]. With s and c denoting the
strategic and competitive cases, respectively, it is computed
as:
RMAIi ≡ PS
s
i − PSci
PSci
,
where the producer surplus is computed as
PSi = piyi −
∑
f∈Fi
cfixfi.
Table XIV displays the RMAI values for each generator in
hour 0. It is consistent with the counterintuitive LI results for
the strategic model in that the RMAI values for generators
1-3 increase as R increases from 0.0 to 0.1. At the highest
level of fixed demand, the high-cost generators co-located with
demand exploit the opportunity provided by the load pocket
created by transmission congestion and reduce the profits of
the low-cost generators separated from the demand. When
the fixed demand constraints are relaxed slightly, the low-cost
generators can make more profit relative to the competitive
benchmark.
8TABLE XI
COMPETITIVE BENCHMARK EQUILIBRIUM PRICES AND QUANTITIES IN HOUR 0. DEMAND SATISFIED SHOWN IN ITALICS IF IT INCLUDES SOME
PRICE-SENSITIVE DEMAND.
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6
R y1 p1 y2 p2 y3 p3 y4 p4 q4 y5 p5 q5 p6 q6
0.0 422.82 16.30 33.33 15.18 110.00 15.18 0.00 21.48 250.00 333.85 32.80 300.00 36.92 350.00
0.1 414.39 16.30 33.33 15.18 110.00 15.18 0.00 21.48 225.00 252.27 32.80 270.00 36.92 315.00
0.2 405.97 16.30 33.33 15.71 110.00 15.71 0.00 19.03 200.00 170.69 25.00 240.00 27.17 280.00
0.3 397.55 16.30 33.33 15.71 110.00 15.71 0.00 19.03 175.00 89.12 25.00 210.00 27.17 245.00
0.4 389.13 16.30 33.33 15.71 110.00 15.71 0.00 19.03 150.00 7.54 25.00 180.00 27.17 210.00
0.5 299.83 16.30 100.00 16.19 110.00 16.19 0.00 16.82 125.00 0.00 17.97 170.96 18.39 213.87
0.6 281.72 16.30 100.00 16.20 110.00 16.20 0.00 16.75 100.00 0.00 17.73 174.02 18.08 217.69
0.7 263.61 16.30 100.00 16.22 110.00 16.22 0.00 16.67 75.00 0.00 17.48 177.09 17.78 221.52
0.8 249.47 16.30 100.00 16.23 110.00 16.23 0.00 16.61 55.49 0.00 17.29 179.48 17.54 224.51
0.9 249.47 16.30 100.00 16.23 110.00 16.23 0.00 16.61 55.49 0.00 17.29 179.48 17.54 224.51
1.0 249.47 16.30 100.00 16.23 110.00 16.23 0.00 16.61 55.49 0.00 17.29 179.48 17.54 224.51
TABLE XIII
DUAL PRICES RELEVANT TO LIS FOR GENERATORS 2 AND 3 IN HOUR 0 IN
THE COMPETITIVE BENCHMARK. COST c∗j AND DUAL VALUE ρ∗j ARE
FOR THE MARGINAL FUEL ARC DIRECTED INTO NODE j .
Node 2 Node 3
R c∗2 ρ∗2 µ2 c∗3 ρ∗3 µ3
0.0 15.00 0.18 0.00 14.83 0.00 0.36
0.1 15.00 0.18 0.00 14.83 0.00 0.36
0.2 15.00 0.71 0.00 14.83 0.00 0.89
0.3 15.00 0.71 0.00 14.83 0.00 0.89
0.4 15.00 0.71 0.00 14.83 0.00 0.89
0.5 15.90 0.00 0.29 14.83 0.00 1.36
0.6 15.90 0.00 0.30 14.83 0.00 1.38
0.7 15.90 0.00 0.32 14.83 0.00 1.40
0.8 15.90 0.00 0.33 14.83 0.00 1.41
0.9 15.90 0.00 0.33 14.83 0.00 1.41
1.0 15.90 0.00 0.33 14.83 0.00 1.41
TABLE XIV
RELATIVE MARKET ADVANTAGE INDICES IN HOUR 0.
R Gen 1 Gen 2 Gen 3 Gen 4 Gen 5
0.0 2.44 139.61 14.29 2.18
0.1 2.49 143.58 14.67 1.30
0.2 2.37 36.09 7.48
0.3 2.25 37.92 7.85
0.4 2.14 37.53 7.77
0.5 1.22 11.10 3.98
0.6 0.77 8.24 3.01
0.7 0.62 6.38 2.37
0.8 0.46 4.65 1.75
0.9 0.35 3.53 1.36
1.0 0.35 3.53 1.36
V. CONCLUSION
Numerical results obtained here indicate the feasibility of
including fixed demands in this equilibrium model of a fuel
and electricity system. In the strategic-generator model, Lerner
Indices for generators counter-intuitively move in opposition
to amounts of fixed demands for three reasons. The first
two occur because high amounts of fixed demands may not
increase electricity prices at every node in the network. In
the numerical example studied here, low-cost generators are
located at “supply” nodes that are separated from the demand
by a congested transmission line when the demands are high
while higher-cost generation is co-located with the demands.
When the fixed demands are reduced, the prices at the supply
nodes climb slightly, so that their generator Lerner Indices
increase. Examination of the dual prices obtained from solving
the complementarity problem that describes an equilibrium
reveals that LMPs at the supply nodes rise either because the
value of additional generating capacity increases there or the
residual demands seen by those strategic generators increase as
fixed demands decrease. As the generator capacity impact also
appears in the competitive benchmark, it is not a consequence
of the Cournot or bounded rationality assumptions on the
generators. The third reason generator Lerner Indices increase
when fixed demands decrease results from the piecewise-
linear cost function derived from the fuel supply network
incorporated here. Trends in the Relative Market Advantage
Indices of generators echo some of the Lerner Index results.
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